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Abstract
This paper offers a unified analytical treatment of Marx’s theory of rent. I highlight
the key role played by the price of the agricultural commodity in determining rent. I
offer two closures of the model. The first closure is an elaboration of Marx’s argument
in Volume III of Capital. The second closure explicitly allows for the role of demand.
I also show that total rent can be decomposed into three components: absolute rent,
differential rent I, and differential rent II. A Marxist theory can explain rent in any
system of capitalist commodity production which uses privately owned nonreproducible
resources.
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Introduction

In the discipline of economics, there are at least two different conceptions of rent (Brown,
1941; Wessel, 1967). The first conception comes from the work of Vilfredo Pareto and
conceptualises rent as the excess return to a factor of production over its next best alternative
∗
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use (Wessel, 1967). This notion of rent is the dominant way of conceptualizing ‘economic
rent’ in contemporary economics. It has been used in the influential literature on rent-seeking
activities and its negative impact on economic growth and efficiency (Krueger, 1974; Murphy
et al., 1993).
There is an alternative and older conception of rent that comes from the work of classical thinkers like David Ricardo and Karl Marx. In this alternative understanding, rent is
conceptualized as the fraction of national income appropriated by owners of scarce, nonreproducible resources that can be used in the process of production. Here the focus is explicitly
on the distribution of income between the fundamental classes of society. A neoclassical
interpretation of this alternative, classical conception of rent can replace social classes with
factors of production and thinks of rent as the excess return earned by a factor of production
over what would be necessary to induce it to do its work (Wessel, 1967). In this paper, I will
work with the classical conception of rent as a fraction of national income and investigate
the economic mechanisms that can account for its emergence. In particular, I will develop a
unified, analytical account of the classical theory of rent presented in Volume III of Capital
(Marx, 1993).
In the three volumes of Capital, Marx offers a penetrating, critical analysis of the structure
and long term dynamics of the capitalist mode of production. The analysis and presentation
in Capital is organized into three volumes and conducted at two different levels of abstraction. Volumes I and II operate at the level of what Marx calls ‘capital in general’, where
competition between capitals is abstracted from, and Volume III operates at the level of
‘many capitals’, where competition is introduced back into the analysis. In terms of substantive issues, in Volume I of Capital, Marx analyses the process of production of capital,
i.e. the process of the generation of surplus value through the exploitation of labour, and the
accumulation of surplus value to create additional capital.1 After analysing the issues related
to the realisation of surplus value in Volume II, Marx takes up the analysis of distribution
of surplus value in Volume III of Capital.2
1

Towards the end of Volume I, Marx introduces the issue of distribution of surplus value. “The capitalist
who produces surplus-value, i.e. who extracts unpaid labour directly from the workers and fixes it in
commodities, is admittedly the first appropriator of his surplus-value, but he is by no means its ultimate
proprietor. He has to share it afterwards with capitalists who fulfil other functions in social reproduction
taken as a whole, with the owner of the land, and with yet other people. Surplus-value is therefore split
up into various parts. Its fragments fall to various categories of person, and take on various mutually
independent forms, such as profit, interest, gains made through trade, ground rent, etc.” (Marx, 1992, 709).
But the full-blown analysis of distribution has to wait till Volume III, when the analysis moves to a lower
level of abstraction.
2
For a discussion of the structure and content of Capital, see Basu (2017).
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Marx’s analysis of the distribution of surplus value in Volume III proceeds in two analytically separate steps. In the first step, the total surplus value generated in production is
distributed across different sectors through the competition between ‘industrial’ capitals.3
Competition is manifested in the mobility of capital across sectors in search of higher rates
of profit. The long run equilibrium of this competitive process is the emergence of an average rate of profit across all sectors, supported by ‘prices of production’, which necessarily
implies a redistribution of the different magnitudes of surplus value generated across sectors
due to the differences in organic compositions of capital (Baumol, 1974). In the second step,
some of the surplus value appropriated by ‘industrial’ capital is further redistributed to other
fractions of the ruling class as commercial profit, ground-rent and interest.
While Marx was clear that ground-rent could arise in any sector that used natural resources for commodity production, he offered most of his analyses in terms of the specifics
of agricultural production. The emergence of ground-rent in agriculture requires, according
to Marx, two conditions: a lower than average organic composition of capital in agriculture,
and the presence of landed property, where with landed property comes the monopoly of use
of the land.
Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to
the exclusion of others. (Marx, 1993, 752).
The first condition - lower than average organic composition of capital in agriculture - gives
rise to higher than the economy-wide average rate of profit. Marx refers to this as ‘surplus
profit’. The second condition - presence of landed property - erects what Marx calls an
‘absolute barrier’ to the mobility of capital. The impediment to the free movement of
capital into agriculture has two effects: it prevents the surplus profit from flowing away
from agriculture, as would have happened if there were no barriers to the mobility of capital
into agriculture; and, equally importantly, it allows this surplus profit to be appropriated by
the class of landowners, i.e. the owners of the land, as ground-rent.
Marx’s theory of ground-rent outlined above raises two questions. The first question
relates to the domain of applicability of the theory. Is Marx’s theory of ground-rent applicable
3

The term ‘industrial capital’ should be understood broadly as referring to capital that is involved in the
production of commodities, which can be goods or services. It does not refer to industrial production only.
Marx uses this term to distinguish capital involved in production from ‘merchant capital’, which is involved
in the purchase and sale of commodities and ‘usurious capital’, which is involved in lending and borrowing
of money. Both these forms of capital predate ‘industrial capital’ and are characterized by the fact that
they appropriate value through unequal exchange but do not organize the production of commodities and
the concomitant generation of surplus value.
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beyond agriculture? The answer is in the affirmative, as Marx himself emphasised. The
theory of ground-rent can be applied to any sector of capitalist commodity production which
uses a nonreprdoducible natural resource that is privately owned. Hence, the analysis can
be applied to other sectors like mining, oil and natural gas, real estate, tourism. But this
immediately raises the second question. How important is the assumption of lower-thanaverage organic composition of capital? If the assumption of lower-than-average organic
composition of capital is crucial for the logic of emergence of ground-rent, then it is doubtful
if Marx’s theory can be applied to any sector at all. Not only is mining, oil and natural
gas, and real estate as capital intensive as the rest of the economy, it is no longer possible
to assert that even agriculture is less capital intensive than the rest of the economy (other
than in some developing countries).
The main contribution of this paper is to develop a consistent, unified Marxist theory of
rent.4 In developing this theory, I will use the term “land” for any nonreprdoducible natural
resource that is privately owned and can be used in the production of commodities; I will
use the term “agriculture” to refer to the economic activity of producing some commodity
on the “land”; and I will use the term “agricultural commodity” to refer to the commodity
that is produced on the “land”. After setting up the basic model, I will highlight the key
role played by the price of the agricultural commodity for the theory of rent.5 I offer two
mechanisms for determining the price of the agricultural commodity.
The first mechanism develops the first closure of the basic model of rent. In terms of
specifics, this closure is a development of Marx’s argument in Volume III of Capital. It
relies on the juxtaposition of lower-than-average organic composition of capital and barriers
to mobility of capital to explain rent. In developing this closure, I show that there is one
significant way in which Marx’s account needs to be amended: just lower than average
organic composition of capital is not sufficient for generating rent; a stronger, concavity
condition about the lower organic composition of capital in agriculture is needed.
The second mechanism develops the second closure of the model of rent. In this closure,
I extend Marx’s analysis in several significant ways. First, unlike the analysis in Volume III
4

In this context, it is important to clarify that the commonly used term rent to refer to payments made
to use a building, or apartment, for a fixed period of time is conceptually very different from ‘rent’ that I
discuss in this paper. When a building or apartment is rented out, the transaction involves a piecemeal sale
of a commodity (the building or the apartment). Thus the rent one pays to use a building or apartment for
a fixed period of time is a portion of the price of the building or apartment. The ‘rent’ that I discuss in
this paper, on the other hand, is a portion of the surplus value appropriated by an owner of a non-produced
resource that is limited in quantity and can be used in capitalist commodity production.
5
While Marx uses the term ‘ground-rent’, I will use the term ‘rent’ to emphasize its generality.
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of Capital, this closure allows for a direct role of demand. Hence, unlike Marx’s analysis and
the contemporary neo-Ricardian analysis, where the output of the agricultural commodity is
taken as given, I allow for the joint determination of the output and price of the agricultural
commodity, the latter in turn, determining the magnitude of rent. Second, it moves away
from the analysis of Volume III by dispensing with the assumption of lower-than-average
organic composition of capital. This is very important because it now increases the applicability of this Marxist theory of rent to a wide range of contemporary contexts where the
assumption of lower-than-average organic composition of capital can no longer be justified.
In developing the Marxist theory of rent, this paper connects with several strands of
extant literature. First, it speaks directly to the large Marxist literature on rent (Eaton,
1963; Mandel, 1968; Fine, 1979; Rubin, 1979; Ghosh, 1985; Foley, 1986; Howard and King,
1992; Samuelson, 1992; Ramirez, 2009). The main contribution of this paper, with respect to
the existing Marxist literature, is that I formalize the theory of rent. Marx used a series of,
often confusing, examples in Volume III of Capital to illustrate his arguments. Later authors
followed him in presenting arguments mostly with the help of examples. Specific examples
are driven by specific assumptions, and so it is not possible to understand the general logic
of the argument with the help of examples only. A formal, mathematical framework, on the
other hand, can help us grasp general arguments.6
Second, it indirectly speaks to the contemporary neo-Ricardian literature on rent. Within
the classical tradition, the theory of rent was elaborated most clearly by David Ricardo
(Ricardo, 1821), which was further developed by Piero Sraffa (Sraffa, 1960). A clear, formal
treatment of the neo-Ricardian theory of rent in a general n-sector economy with linear
technology can be found in Kurz (1978). The Marxist theory of rent that I develop in
this paper differs from the neo-Ricardian literature on rent in several ways. While the neoRicardian analysis uses a general equilibrium framework, the Marxian theory developed in
this paper is a partial equilibrium analysis. This shortcoming of the theory developed in
this paper comes with certain advantages over the the general equilibrium neo-Ricardian
analysis. The neo-Ricardian analysis uses linear technology, but the Marxian theory allows
for nonlinear technologies. The neo-Ricardian analysis does not have any place for demand,
and conducts the whole analysis by taking the level of output (of the agricultural commodity)
6

The discussion of rent in volume three of Capital shows that Marx was clearly aware of three types
of ground-rent: (a) rent arising from monopoly price (Marx, 1993, pp. 898-899); (b) differential rent; and
(c) absolute rent. While Marx briefly discusses the issue of rent that depends on monopoly price (for an
illuminating example of a vineyard, see Marx (1993, pp. 910)), he devotes the bulk of the analysis to
differential and absolute rent. In this paper, I follow Marx and only discuss differential and absolute rent.
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as given. In contrast, the Marxian theory developed in this paper allows for the role of
demand in jointly determining output and price of the agricultural commodity, the latter, in
turn, determining the magnitude of rent. Finally, the neo-Ricardian analysis does not allow
for the existence of absolute rent; the Marxian theory not only explains absolute rent, but
accords it an important place in the whole analytical framework.7
Third, it connects to the emerging critical literature on land rent and urban housing
(Haila, 2016; Obeng-Odoom, 2017; Ryan-Collins et al., 2017). While the traditional understanding of high rent and prices of real estate in urban areas has often seen zoning regulation
as a key causative factor (Glaeser et al., 2005), the emerging critical literature digs deeper
into the reasons for limited supply and tries to identify different classes that benefit from
the restricted supply (Haila, 2016). This paper offers a coherent theoretical framework that
could inform discussions of land rent in critical urban studies (Ball et al., 1985; Haila, 1990;
Aalbers, 2016; Haila, 2016; Ward and Aalbers, 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce the basic setup;
in section 3, I define the terms ‘surplus profit’ and ‘rent’, discuss the three components of
rent and highlight the key condition for the existence of rent; in section 4, I develop the first
closure of the model of rent, which is an elaboration of the argument of Marx in Volume III
of Capital ; in section 5, I develop a second closure of the model that extends Marx’s analysis
by explicitly incorporating the role of demand and profit-maximizing behavior of capitalist
farmers. I conclude the discussion in section 6 with some caveats and ideas about extensions.

2

Basic Set-up

Suppose total land is divided into N plots and is indexed by i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Let Ai denote
the area of plot i; and yi denote the quantity of agricultural output produced on plot i.

2.1

Hierarchy of Quality and Rates of Profit

In this paper I will study a situation where technology and distribution is given, i.e. the real
wage rate is given and each plot of land uses a given technique of production. Let ci denote
the constant capital (the amount of money used to purchase means of production) on plot
i; and let vi denote variable capital (the amount of money used to purchase labour power)
7

One of the key insight emerging from Kurz (1978) is that rankings of plots of land and magnitudes of
rent can change when there is a change in distributional factors. I incorporate this insight into my analysis
by deriving all results on the basis of given technologies and real wage rates.
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on plot i.8 Thus, the total cost of production (which is also the total capital investment)
on plot i is given by ci + vi , the sum of constant and variable capital.9 Let ki denote the
average cost of production on plot i, i.e.,
ki =

ci + v i
.
yi

(1)

Let us define the relative “quality of a plot of land” with reference to its average cost of
production, i.e. plot i is of higher quality than plot j if the average cost of production on
the former is lower than in the latter: ki < kj .10 Since the real wage rate and techniques
of production on each plot are given, we can define the average cost of production on each
plot and so, without loss of generality, let i = 1, 2, . . . , N index plots of land arranged in
increasing order of quality.11 Thus, plot 1 refers to the worst, plot 2 to the next-worst plot
and so on, with plot N referring to the best plot of land.
The hierarchy of the quality of plots of land is an important characteristic of the agricultural economy under study and emphasizes the fact that the average cost of production
stands in a relationship of hierarchy across plots, with the worst plot of land having the
highest average cost and the best plot having the lowest average cost of production. We
state this important characteristic of the agricultural economy as
Assumption 1. Let i = 1, 2, . . . , N index the plots of land arranged in increasing order of
quality, and therefore in decreasing order of average cost of production. Then, we have
k1 > k2 > · · · > kN ,

(2)

8
The variable capital needs to be bounded away from zero to ensure that the organic composition of
capital does not increase without bounds. The economic content of this assumption is that production
cannot take place without labour, a most meaningful assumption. Moreover, I abstract from fixed capital in
this paper. Hence, I assume that all the means of production is used up in one production cycle.
9
All costs and prices are expressed in terms of units of money. One can use a monetary expression
of labour time (MELT) to convert freely between monetary and value magnitudes, following the logic in
Foley (1982). Using the MELT and taking an aggregate perspective allows us to deal with the so-called
transformation problem that Samuelson (1971) thought was fatal to Marxian economics. For further details,
see Foley (1982, 2000); Mohun and Veneziani (2017).
10
Quality of a plot of land comes both from its “fertility” and “location” (Marx, 1993, pp. 789). The
locational advantage of plots of land figures as an important determinant of rent and has been explored in
the urban economics literature; for instance, see the classic account in Alonso (1964).
11
If two or more plots have the same average average cost of production, we merge them into one and use
their average value for the analysis in this paper.
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where
ki =

ci + v i
yi

denotes the average average cost of production on plot i.
The hierarchy of quality of plots of land will imply a reverse hierarchy of rates of profit
when commodity production using land is organized along capitalist lines. We state this
below as
Proposition 1. Let ri denote the rate of profit earned by capitalist commodity production
on plot i, where i = 1, 2, . . . , N . If the economy is characterised by a hierarchy in the quality
of plots of land given by Assumption 1, then we have
r1 < r2 < · · · < rN .

3

(3)

Surplus Profit and Rent

3.1

Definition and Logic

Let α denote the economy-wide average rate of profit, and let ri denote the rate of profit
on plot i. A comparison of ri with α allows us to define what Marx referred to as ‘surplus
profit’ on plot i as
SPi = (ci + vi )ri − (ci + vi )α = (ci + vi )(ri − α),

(4)

where SPi refers to surplus profit. Hence, surplus profit on any plot is the profit income
earned by capital invested on that plot over and above what could be earned at the economywide average rate of profit.
Let us consider two different configuration of property relations under which agricultural
production can be organized in this economy.
• The capitalist owner-farmer economy: In this configuration, all plots of land are owned
by capitalist farmers, who organize agricultural production by hiring wage labour and
investing their own (or borrowed) capital.
• The capitalist tenant-farmer economy: In this configuration, all plots of land are owned
by non-cultivating landlords. Tenant-farmers organize agricultural production by hir8

ing wage labour and investing their own (or borrowed) capital, as before, but with
the key difference that they have to rent out land – the key input into agricultural
production – from the landlords.
If commodity production is organized under the first configuration of property relations,
all surplus profit is earned by capitalist farmers as super-normal profit. On the other hand, if
commodity production is organized under the second configuration of property relations, i.e.
if we consider a capitalist tenant-farmer economy, then the surplus profit on plot i takes the
form of rent. The landlord who owns plot i rents it out for a rental payment that is exactly
equal to the surplus profit, and thereby appropriates the surplus profit as ground rent. This
is the essence of Marx’s idea that rent is merely a ‘transformation of surplus profit’. Hence,
letting GRi denote the rent on plot i, we have
GRi = SPi = (ci + vi )(ri − α).

(5)

What is the logic for the emergence of rent? In a capitalist economy, land is privately
owned - by the class of landowners. Hence there is no free land. Since land can be used
in capitalist commodity production, it confers a strategic advantage to the owners of land.
They can withhold access to land unless the capitalist commodity producer is willing to
make a payment - the rental payment - for accessing the land. Hence, landowners can
bargain with capitalist commodity producers who use land for a share of the surplus value
they realize. One possible equilibrium outcome of the bargaining between landowners and
capitalist commodity producers is that the rental payment is exactly equal to the surplus
profit generated on a plot of land. If the capitalist gives up all of the surplus profit to the
landowner as rent, she is left with exactly the amount of surplus value that ensures her an
economy-wide average rate of profit. By moving her capital to a different line of production,
she would earn, on average, exactly what she earns in capitalist commodity production using
land. Hence, she has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium outcome. The landowner
has no incentive to deviate too. This is because she cannot expect to get a rental payment
in excess of the surplus profit. If she asks for a rental payment that is larger than the
surplus profit, the capitalist will move to another line of production. Hence, this is the best
the landowner can do. Thus, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining between landowners
and capitalist commodity producers leads to a contractual rental payment from the capitalist
to the landowner - which is rent - that is exactly equal to the surplus profit.

9

3.2

Components of Rent

Marx had argued that the total rent on any plot of land can be decomposed into three parts,
differential rent of the first variety, differential rent of the second variety and absolute rent.
A little algebraic manipulation shows that this is indeed the case:
GRi = DRIi + DRIIi + AR

(6)

where
DRIi = (ci + vi )(ri − r1 )
is differential rent of the first variety,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi ) − (c1 + v1 )] (r1 − α)
is differential rent of the second variety, and
AR = (c1 + v1 )(r1 − α)
is absolute rent.
The logic underlying the three components of rent are very different. Differential rent of
the first variety arises due to differences in the quality of the plots of land, as captured by
the differences in the average cost of production across plots. For plot i, the benchmark plot
for making quality comparisons is the marginal land, i.e. the worst plot of land. Hence,
DRIi = (ci + vi )(ri − r1 ),
where ri − r1 captures the difference in quality of plot i with respect to the benchmark plot,
and ci + vi is the magnitude of capital invested on the plot. Since no production can take
place without labour, the magnitude of variable capital on plot i is bounded away from zero
(while the magnitude of constant capital is non-negative). Hence ci + vi > 0, which implies
that DRIi ≥ 0 (since ri − r1 > 0 by Proposition 1).
Differential rent of the second variety arises from the differences in the magnitudes of
capital invested across plots of land. For plot i, the difference in magnitude of capital invested
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is also measured with respect to the marginal land, i.e. the worst plot of land. Hence,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi ) − (c1 + v1 )] (r1 − α),
where [(ci + vi ) − (c1 + v1 )] captures the difference in magnitude of capital invested. This
way of defining DRII is different from the way Marx defined it. To define DRII, Marx
abstracts from differences in quality of plots of land and thinks of it as the surplus profit on
all ‘doses of capital’ in comparison to the least productive dose. The key difficulty in this
definition is that there is no natural way to define ‘doses of capital’.12 I avoid this difficulty
by defining DRII as the part of rent coming from the difference in magnitude of capital
invested vis-a-vis the worst plot.
Of course, this implies some ambiguity about the sign of the differential rent of the second
variety. As long as the total capital invested on plot i is higher than the capital invested
on the worst plot of land, DRII will be positive. But, if the total capital invested on plot
i were to fall below the capital investment on the worst plot, then the magnitude of the
differential rent of the second variety will turn negative. This does not create any problems
for the overall analysis because the sum total of DRI and DRII will always be positive as
long as the total rent on all plots is greater than the total rent on the worst plot.
While we can see easily that differential rent of both varieties arise from differences with
respect to the worst plot of land - DRI from differences in quality, and DRII from differences
in capital invested - it also implies that the worst plot of land cannot generate these types
of rent. Hence we have to confront the question as to whether the worst plot generates any
rent. While Ricardo, and the neo-Ricardian tradition building on Sraffa’s formalization of
Ricardo, thinks that there can be no rent on the marginal land, Marx argues that position. If
land has become private property and there is no free land, argues Marx, then no landowner,
including the owner of the worst plot, will give her plot gratis.13 In the Marxist framework,
the total rent on the worst plot of land is called ‘absolute rent’. That is why the absolute
12

One way to circumvent this problem is to instead use the marginal cost of production, as I do in the
second closure in section 5 below. The marginal cost of production is the “dose” of capital needed to produce
the last unit of output on each plot of land. Hence it is a natural way to extend and complete Marx’s idea
about “dose of capital”.
13
As long as landed property exists, no plot of land, including the worst plot, will be available gratis for
use in commodity production (Marx, 1993, pp. 884–885, 890–891). “Assuming then that demand requires
the taking up of new land which is, say, less fertile than that previously cultivated, will the owner of this land
lease it for nothing just because the market price of its product has risen high enough for capital investment
to pay the farmer the price of production and thus yield him the customary profit? In no way. The capital
investment must yield him a rent. He leases only when a lease-price can be paid.” (Marx, 1993, pp. 891).
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rent is given by
AR = (c1 + v1 )(r1 − α),
which is the surplus profit earned on the worst plot of land. Since ri > α for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
this means that r1 − α > 0. Hence, absolute rent is positive.

3.3

Key Condition for the Emergence of Rent

What is the key condition for the generation of rent? Since rent is merely a transformation
of surplus profit, the key condition for rent is the same as the condition for the existence
of surplus profit. Proposition 1 shows that existence of surplus profit on the worst plot is
sufficient to ensure existence of surplus profit on all plots. Hence, the key condition for the
generation of rent on all plots is the existence of surplus profit on the worst plot of land.
Let p̃ denote the price of the agricultural commodity which ensures the economy-wide
average rate of profit, α, on the worst plot of land, i.e. the plot of land indexed by i = 1.
Since the output on plot 1 is given by y1 , we have
p̃y1 = (c1 + v1 ) (1 + α)
so that

p̃ =

c1 + v1
y1


(1 + α) = k1 (1 + α) .

(7)

Whenever the price of the agricultural commodity is higher than p̃, all plots of land will
generate surplus profit. Let us note this as
Proposition 2. Let p denote the market price of the commodity produced on land. If p > p̃,
then all plots of land generate surplus profit and hence rent.
The proof follows immediately from a conjunction of two facts: (a) that the price level
of p̃ ensures surplus profit on the worst plot of land, and (b) that there is a hierarchy of
profit rates in agriculture with profit rates increasing with the quality of the plot of land
(see Proposition 1).
The generation of surplus profit and its transformation into rent on all plots of land
is depicted in Figure 1 and 2. In each of these figures, the plots of land are arranged in
increasing order of quality on the horizontal axis, and prices are measured on the vertical
12

Generic Market
Price

Surplus
Profit

Price greater than this ensures
surplus profit on the worst plot

Surplus Profit

Notional Price
of Production:
k1*(1+α)

...
Plot 1

Plot 2

Plot 4

Plot 3

Notional Price
of Production:
kN*(1+α)
Plot N

Figure 1: Surplus profit on all plots of land with a relatively high market price of the commodity.

axis. Two important price levels are marked on the figures: p̃ is shown as a (red) broken
horizontal line, and the market price is shown as a (blue) solid horizontal line. The vertical
boxes represents the notional price of production on each plot of land, i.e. it is the price
which would ensure the economy-wide rate of profit on the plot. For instance on plot i, the
height of the vertical box is given by ki (1 + α). The (red) broken horizontal line, which
indicates the price p̃, is drawn exactly at the height of the vertical box for plot 1 (worst plot)
because p̃ is the level of market price which would ensure the economy-wide average rate of
profit on the worst plot.
The (blue) solid horizontal line represents the market price and the difference between
the market price and the height of the vertical box on any plot gives the surplus profit on
that plot. Thus, the surplus profit on the worst plot is the difference in the heights of the

13

(blue) solid horizontal line and the (red) broken horizontal line. On any other plot, the total
surplus profit is higher in magnitude and includes the surplus profit on the worst plot as its
part. Turning to Figure 2, we see the transformation of surplus profit into rent. On any
plot, the total surplus profit is the total rent. The total rent on the worst plot is absolute
rent. On any other plot, the total rent is the sum of absolute rent and differential rent.

Generic Market
Price

Absolute
Rent

Absolute
Rent

Price greater than this ensures
surplus profit on the worst plot

Differential
Rent

Notional Price
of Production:
k1*(1+α)

...
Plot 1

Plot 2

Plot 4

Plot 3

Notional Price
of Production:
kN*(1+α)
Plot N

Figure 2: Ground-rent on all plots of land with a relatively high market price of the commodity.

The analysis in this section shows that the price of the (agricultural) commodity is key
to the emergence of rent. We offer two closures of the above model, i.e. two mechanisms
to determine the price of the agricultural commodity. The first closure is a formalization
of Marx’s ideas in Volume III of Capital. Here price is determined by the principle that all
surplus value generated in agriculture is realized within agriculture because of barriers to
entry of capital. If the organic composition of capital in agriculture is ‘sufficiently lower’
14

than the economy-wide average organic composition, then zero net flow of surplus value can
generate rent on all plots of land. The key problem of this closure is that it does not allow for
the role of demand in the the determination of the price of the agricultural commodity. The
second closure addresses this lacuna and explicitly allows for demand to jointly determine
the output and price levels.

4

Determination of the Price Level: First Closure

In Marx’s analysis the price of the agricultural commodity is determined by the principle
that agriculture retains all the surplus value it generates. Let p∗ denote the price of the
agricultural commodity at which agriculture as a whole realises the total surplus value it
P
P
P
generates. Let Y = i yi , C = i ci and V = i vi ; then,
p∗ Y = (C + V ) (1 + r∗ )
where
r∗ =

eV
e
e
=
=
C +V
1 + (C/V )
1 + OCCA

(8)

and e is the common rate of exploitation (ratio of surplus value and variable capital) that
obtains in all sectors of the economy, and
P
ci
C
OCCA =
= Pi
V
i vi
is the organic composition of capital for the agricultural sector as a whole. Hence,
∗

p =



C +V
Y



(1 + r∗ ) .

(9)

The agricultural economy is characterised by the following two conditions, where the first
condition relates to the price of the agricultural commodity and the second relates to the
organic composition of capital in agriculture.
Assumption 2. (Price and Organic Composition of Capital).
1. Price: Let the price of the agricultural commodity, p, be determined by the principle
that there is zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture, so that p = p∗ , with p∗
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defined in (9).
2. Organic composition of capital: Let z1 = 1 + OCCA , where OCCA denotes the organic
composition of capital in agriculture as a whole; let z2 = 1 + OCCE , where OCCE
denotes the economy-wide organic composition of capital. Let the two be related as
follows:
z1 ≤ f (z2 ) =

ez2
,
(β − 1) z2 + eβ

where
β=

(c1 + v1 )/y1
(C + V )/Y

and we have 1 + e > β, and z2 > eβ/ (1 + e − β).
The first part of Assumption 2 relates to the determination of the market price of the
agricultural commodity. It stipulates that the market price of the agricultural commodity is
determined by the principle that agriculture retains all the surplus value it generates. The
latter assumption is justified by the fact of existence of barriers to movement of capital in
agriculture. This implies that the price of the agricultural commodity is given by p = p∗ ,
defined in (9). It is important to point out that this is only one, though by no means the
only, way to determine the market price of the agricultural commodity. We use it in the first
closure of the model because this is close to the intuitive idea Marx worked with: barriers to
the movement of capital into agriculture would allow agriculture to retain the surplus profit
(and hence the total surplus value) it generates.
The second part of Assumption 2 imposes restrictions on the relative magnitudes of the
organic composition in agriculture (OCCA ) and the economy-wide organic composition of
capital (OCCE ). In Volume III of Capital, Marx worked with the assumption that the organic
composition of capital in agriculture as a whole is lower than the organic composition of
capital in the whole economy. The second part of Assumption 2 is a more stringent conditon
because it requires that
z1 ≤ f (z2 ) =

ez2
.
(β − 1) z2 + eβ

The fact that this condition is more stringent than the simple requirement of lower OCC in
agriculture than the OCC in the aggregate economy can be seen from Figure 3. The curve
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OCCA: organic composition of capital in agriculture
OCCE: economy-wide organic composition of capital

Z1=1+OCCA

f(z2)
e/(β-1)

1
e/(β-1+eβ)

45˚
1

eβ/(1+e-β)

Z2=1+OCCE

Figure 3: Upper bound function for the organic composition in agriculture. For any value of
z2 = 1 + OCCE , the function f (z2 ) gives the upper bound on z1 = 1 + OCCA that ensures the result
in Assumption 2.

representing f (z2 ) lies completely below the 45 degree line.14 Hence, any point on or below
the curve automatically satisfies the condition that OCCA < OCCE . But there are points
in Figure 3 that are above the curve and below the 45 degree line. These points satisfy
the requirement that OCCA < OCCE but do not satisfy the stronger condition required by
Assumption 2.
Proposition 3. Suppose the conditions prevailing in the economy is captured by Assumption 2. Then, we have the following:
1. p∗ > p̃, i.e. the price determined by the principle of zero net flow of surplus value
out of agriculture, p∗ , is larger in magnitude than the price that is necessary to ensure
surplus profit on the worst plot of land, p̃.
2. The total rent appropriated by the landowner of the i-th plot of land, GRi , is positive.
14

This is because f (1) < 1 and f 0 (1) < 1.
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This is because ri − α > 0, where ri is the rate of profit on plot i and α is the economywide average rate of profit.
Proposition 3 shows that if the organic composition of capital in agriculture is ‘sufficiently lower’ than the economy-wide organic composition of capital and if barriers to entry
ensures zero net flow of surplus value out of agriculture, then each plot of land can generate
surplus profit. Since rent is merely a transformation of surplus profit, Proposition 3 demonstrates that if the organic composition of capital in agriculture is ‘sufficiently lower’ than the
economy-wide organic composition of capital and if barriers to entry ensures zero net flow
of surplus value out of agriculture then each plot of land will generate rent for its owner.
Once we know the magnitude of the total rent, we can quantify the magnitudes of its three
components.
There are at least three problems with the closure outlined in this section. First, it relies
on a sufficiently lower organic composition of capital in agriculture compared to the rest of
the economy. This might have been a reasonable assumption for the agricultural sector in
19-th century Europe, but it is a questionable assumption in much of the contemporary world
(other than possibly the agricultural sector in some developing countries). Moreover, one
impetus for developing a general theory of rent is to be able to apply it beyond agriculture
- and in other sectors as mining, oil and natural gas, real estate, etc. In these sectors, the
assumption of a lower than average organic composition of capital is even less convincing.
Second, the closure outlined in this section relies on barriers to the entry of capital into
the agricultural sector due to the presence of landed property. While it is true that landed
property acts as a barrier to entry of capital, that barrier is not insuperable. In fact, capital
can enter into sectors that use land in capitalist commodity production. Hence, dispensing
with this assumption is useful for extending the Marxist theory of rent.
Third, and possibly the most important shortcoming of the closure outlined in this section
is that it does not allow the demand for the agricultural commodity to have any role in the
determination of its level of output or price. In the debate between Ricardo and Malthus
regarding the determination of rent, the issue of demand had been raised by the latter.
Ricardo brushed aside the issue of demand arguing that it could not play any role in the
determination of ‘natural prices’, the latter being understood as long run prices (Kurz, 1978,
pp. 16–17). Marx seemed to have followed Ricardo in this respect, and later neo-Ricardian
analysts have also evaded the issue of demand by taking the level of agricultural output
as given (Kurz, 1978). But it seems a theoretically better strategy to allow for the role of
demand in the determination of output and price.
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5

Determination of the Price Level: Second Closure

Recall that we are studying an agricultural economy, in which there are N plots of land
indexed by i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N , with each plot being owned by one capitalist-farmer. If N
is large, each capitalist-farmer takes the price of the agricultural commodity as given and
decides the level of output to maximize her profit.
If yi and ti (yi ) denote the level of output and the total cost of production, respectively,
on plot i, then profit income is given by
πi (yi ; p) = pyi − ti (yi )
where p denotes the exogenously given (for the individual capitalist farmer) price level and
the total cost of production is a function of the level of output.15
A plausible behavioral assumption is that capitalist farmers choose the level of output to
maximize their profit income. Hence, the profit-maximizing (or optimal) level of output of
the agricultural commodity on the i-th plot will be determined by the following condition:
p = mi (yi ),

i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N,

(10)

where
mi (yi ) = t0i (yi )
is the marginal cost of production. The conditions in (10) tell us that on each of the plots,
the optimal level of output is determined by equating the marginal cost of production with
the exogenously given price level (because of lack of monopoly power of any individual
capitalist-farmer).
Since the amount of land is fixed, it is plausible to assume that each capitalist-farmer is
operating with an increasing marginal cost of production technology. One way to capture
this is to assume that mi (yi ) is a monotonically increasing function of the level of output, yi .
Hence, we can always find an inverse (function) of the marginal cost of production function
to get the profit-maximizing level of output as
yi (p) = m−1
i (p),

(11)

15

The fact that I allow the total cost of production to vary with the level of output means that I depart
from the use of linear technologies that are used in neo-Ricardian analyses.
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which gives us the supply function for each capitalist-farmer, i.e. it determines the level of
output that a profit-maximizing farmer will choose to produce as a function of the price level.
Since the marginal cost of production is monotonically increasing, each of the individual
supply functions, being the inverse of the marginal cost of production function, will be
monotonically increasing as well.
The total supply function for the agricultural output is the sum of the individual supply
functions. Denoting the total supply function for the agricultural output as S(p), we will
have
S(p) =

N
X

yi (p) =

i=1

N
X

m−1
i (p).

(12)

i=1

with S 0 > 0 because each of the individual supply functions have yi0 (p) > 0. If D(p; z) denotes
the total demand function for the agricultural commodity, with z denoting non-price shift
factors and ∂D/∂p < 0, the equilibrium level of the price will be such that demand and
supply are equal
S(p) = D(p).

(13)

The co-determination of the optimal level of output on the i-th plot of land and the
price level of the agricultural commodity is depicted in Figure 4. On the left panel, we
see the determination of the output level on the i-th plot, and on the right panel, we see
the determination of the price level. On the left panel, quantity of output is measured on
the horizontal axis, and price is measured on the vertical axis. MC and the profit-adjusted
AVC denote the marginal and the profit-adjusted average variable cost of production curves,
respectively.16 If the price level were denoted by OB (or EC), then the profit-maximizing
level of output would be given by OE, the point where the MC curve is equal to the price
level.
The determination of the equilibrium level of the price in the market for the agricultural
commodity is depicted in the right panel of Figure 4. The upward sloping supply curve, S, is
the sum of the individual supply curves given in (12). The downward sloping demand curve,
16

The profit-adjusted AVC curve plots (1 + α) ∗ AV C, where α is the economy-wide average rate of
profit and AVC denotes the average variable cost of production. Given the relationship between averages
and marginals, the MC curve intersects the AVC at the lowest point of the latter. The minimum point of
the AVC is also the minimum point of the profit-adjusted AVC. Since the MC curve is upward-sloping, it
intersects the profit-adjusted curve to the right of the minimum point, as shown in Figure 4.
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Individual Plot of Land
(Generic Plot)

Total Agricultural Market

price

price
OBCE = Total revenue
MC

OHDE = Income of
capitalist farmer

D(p;z)
S(p)

HBCD = Ground Rent
C

B

X’

Ground Rent
H

D

F

G

O

E

Profit-adjusted
AVC: k*(1+α)

quantity

O’

quantity

Figure 4: Determination of equilibrium level of price and quantity in the market for the agricultural
commodity. The profit-adjusted AVC curve gives (1 + α)(c + v).

D, is given by exogenous factors, z. The intersection of the two curves gives the equilibrium
level of the price, which is represented by the height O’B’ (= OB).

5.1

Determination of Rent

Once the price and output levels have been determined, we can determine the levels of rent
by re-working the analysis presented in the previous sections of this paper. Let GRi denote
the rent on plot i. We know that the magnitude of rent is the surplus profit. Hence,
GRi = pyi − (1 + α) yi ki (yi )

(14)
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where ki (yi ) = {ci (yi ) + vi (yi )} /yi is the average variable cost of production (AVC), and α
is the economy-wide average rate of profit.17 This is the same expression as given in (5). To
see this, let ri denote the pre-rent rate of profit realized on the i-th plot. Hence,
ri =

pyi
−1
ci + vi

(15)

where ci and vi denote the constant and variable capital advanced on the i-th plot of land.
Then, total rent on the i-th plot is given by
GRi = (ci + vi )(ri − α),
which is the same expression as the one given in (5).
We can use Figure 4 to pin down the magnitude of rent. For the situation depicted in
Figure 4, the price level is given by OB and the optimal level of output on the individual
plot is given by OE. The rectangle OBCE represents the total revenue, the rectangle OHDE
represents the amount of income of the capitalist farmer, and the rectangle BCDH - the
shaded area - represents the rent income of the landlord. Once we know the total rent, we
can break it up into its three components: absolute rent, differential rent of the first variety
(DRI), and differential rent of the second variety (DRII): where
DRIi = (ci + vi )(ri − r1 )
is differential rent of the first variety,
DRIIi = [(ci + vi ) − (c1 + v1 )] (r1 − α)
is differential rent of the second variety, and
AR = (c1 + v1 )(r1 − α)
is absolute rent.
17

In Figure 4, we plot the profit-adjusted AVC, which is (1 + α) ki (yi ).
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Individual Plots of Land
(Hierarchically Arranged)

Total Agricultural Market

price

price

Profit-adjusted
AVC: k1*(1+α)

MC

D(p;z)
S(p)

C

B

Absolute Rent

H
F

X’
D

G

D’(p;z)

O

E

quantity

O’

quantity

Figure 5: Total rent, absolute and differential rent on every plot of land. The figure also shows
the lower bound of demand that is necessary to ensure that all plots of land are used.

5.2

Demand and Profit Maximization

We can use Figure 5 to get some intuition about the conditions for the generation of rent
and the role of demand (for the agricultural commodity) in that process. In left panel of
Figure 5, we show the situation in multiple plots of land. The profit-adjusted AVC for the
worst plot is the highest. As we move from the worst to better quality plots of land, the
profit-adjusted AVC shift down, as shown in the left panel of Figure 5. With multiple plots
of land, we can also identify the absolute and differential rent. If the demand curve is D(p; z)
and the supply curve is S(p), then the equilibrium price is given by O0 X 0 in the right panel
of Figure 5. We can use this in the left panel to see that absolute rent is represented by the
rectangle BCDH (the total rent on the worst plot); and the differential rent, on any plot,
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is the difference between the total rent and the absolute rent.
Under capitalist relations of production, a plot of land will be used for cultivation only
when two conditions are satisfied: (a) it generates a positive magnitude of rent for the
landlord, and (b) the capital invested on it by the capitalist farmer gives her a rate of profit
of α (the economy-wide average rate of profit). In terms of Figure 5, this puts a lower bound
on the price level: if the equilibrium price level falls below OF , then no capitalist farmer will
invest her capital on the worst plot of land (because the revenue will not cover the variable
cost of production). This, in turn, puts a lower bound on the level of demand (depicted as
D0 (p; z)): if the level of demand for the agricultural commodity is such that the equilibrium
price level fall below OF , then the worst plot of land will lie unused.
An important point about the analysis presented in this section is that by explicitly
incorporating profit-maximizing behavior, I address the possible problem that the rent calculations are sustainable. Once rents are computed on the basis of output levels that satisfy
the marginal cost conditions given in (10), then there will be no incentive for capitalist farmers to deviate from those output levels. This will imply that there will be no possibility for
surplus profit to remain unallocated to rent. Thus, the computation of rent (by landlords)
will be mutually consistent with profit-maximizing behavior (by capitalist farmers).

5.3

Some Comparative Statics

There are two interesting comparative static exercises that could be easily carried out with
the help of Figure 6. First, if there is an exogenous increase in demand, other things remaining constant, there will be an increase in the magnitude of rent. To see this, note that
the exogenous increase in demand will shift the demand curve in the right panel of Figure 6
rightward. The result will be an increase in both the equilibrium price and quantity. This
will increase the area of the rectangle BCDH, which shows that the magnitude of rent will
increase.18
Second, if there is technological progress in agriculture, it will lead to an ambiguous
change in the magnitude of rent. To see this, note that technological progress will lead to
a downward movement of the marginal cost curves, so that the total supply curve in the
18

In the examples Marx used in Chapter 44 of Volume III of Capital, an increase in the demand for the
agricultural output is assumed to lead to a change in the output only on the marginal plot. Later scholars
like Fine (1979) have followed Marx in this respect. But this is a rather restrictive assumption. In any
realistic scenario, an increase in demand will have an impact on the production decisions on all plots of land,
as can be seen in Figure 6. In the model outlined in this section, we do not need to impose the restrictive
assumption.
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right panel of Figure 6 will shift downward (not shown in the Figure). This will lead to an
increase in the quantity of output and a fall in its price. Depending on the elasticity of the
supply curve, this can lead to either a fall or a rise in the magnitude of rent. More inelastic
the demand, higher is the possibility of a fall in the rent.

Individual Plot of Land

Total Agricultural Market

price

price
HBCD = Ground Rent
(old scenario)

MC

H’B’C’D’ = Ground
Rent (new scenario)
B’
B
H’
H
F

D(p;z)
X’’
X’

C’

C

D’
D

S(p)

Profit-adjusted
AVC: k*(1+α)

G

O

E E’

quantity

O’

quantity

Figure 6: Comparative statics of an exogenous increase in the demand for the commodity produced
on land.

6

Conclusion and Caveats

In this paper, I have developed a Marxist theory of rent. In developing this theory, I have
used the term “land” for any nonreprdoducible natural resource that is privately owned and
can be used in the production of commodities; I have used the term “agriculture” to refer
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to the economic activity of producing some commodity on the “land”; and I have used the
term “agricultural commodity” to refer to the commodity that is produced on the “land”.
An immediate implication is that the Marxist theory of rent developed in this paper is
applicable far beyond agriculture proper. It can be applied to any situation where a privately
owned, scarce, nonreproducible resource can be used in capitalist commodity production for instance, in sectors like mining, oil & natural gas, real estate, and even tourism. In such
situations, owners of the resource can bargain away a part of the surplus value (or national
income over and above wages) generated in capitalist commodity production. This fraction
is what classical economists like Ricardo and Marx understood as rent.
In this paper, I have demonstrated that the total rent can be decomposed into two
components: differential rent and absolute rent. Differential rent, in turn, can be decomposed
into differential rent of the first variety (which arises from differences in the quality of plots
of land) and differential rent of the second variety (which arises from the differences in the
magnitude of capital investment on different plots of land). Absolute rent, on the other
hand, arises from the ability of the class of landowners to prevent even the worst quality of
land being given gratis for agricultural production.
After highlighting the key role played by the price of the agricultural commodity in
determining the magnitude of rent, I offered two closures of the model. In the first closure,
the price of the commodity is determined by the principle of zero net flow of surplus value
from agriculture, an argument pursued by Marx in Volume III of Capital. If the organic
composition of capital is sufficiently lower than the economy-wide average, this principle
of price determination can ensure positive rent on all plots of land. In the second closure,
I allow for the explicit role of demand in determining both the output and price of the
agricultural commodity. In the second closure, we can dispense with the requirement of
lower-than-average organic composition of capital. Hence, this increases the applicability of
the Marxist theory of rent to sectors beyond agriculture and to contemporary times as well.
In this paper, I have worked with a case where agricultural producers are price takers.
This can be easily amended to take account of market power and price-making behaviour.
If the market for the agricultural commodity is dominated by a few firms, then the market
price will be higher than the competitive price that I have used in section 5. This will imply
that the rent on each plot of land, including the worst plot, will be higher. Hence, in terms of
the three fold decomposition of total rent that Marx discussed, price-making behavior in the
market for the agricultural commodity will lead to higher absolute rent. All the qualitative
features of the analysis will remain unchanged.
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I would like to end the paper with two caveats. First, I have abstracted from technological
change. Hence the analysis in this paper is static and only investigates the question of the
distribution of a given magnitude of surplus value between capitalists and owners of natural
resources. To make the analysis more realistic, one will need to incorporate technological
change into the framework. Second, the analysis is partial equilibrium in orientation. It
takes the average rate of profit outside agricultural production as given and investigates the
issues of production and distribution within agriculture. To make the analysis more robust,
it will be necessary to extend it to a general equilibrium setting where the average rate of
profit and rent is jointly determined by demand and technology.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let us denote the price of a unit of the agricultural commodity as p and note that
it will be determined by the cost of production in the worst plot of land (Marx, 1993, pp.
797). Since the rate of profit earned by the capitalist-farmer with the worst quality of land,
i.e. the capitalist-farmer indexed by i = 1, is given by r1 ,
py1 = (c1 + v1 ) + r1 (c1 + v1 )
so that the price of an unit of the agricultural commodity is given by

p=

c1 + v1
y1


(1 + r1 ) = k1 (1 + r1 ) .

(16)

All capitalist-farmers will be able to sell their output at the price given in (16). Hence, the
revenue earned by capitalist-farmer i is given by pyi . Since the total cost of production on
plot i is (ci + vi ), using the expression for the price of the agricultural commodity given in
(16), we see that the total profit earned by capitalist i is given by
πi = pyi − (ci + vi ) = k1 yi (1 + r1 ) − (ci + vi ) ,

i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , N.

(17)

Hence, the rate of profit earned by capitalist-farmer i is given by


πi
k1
=
(1 + r1 ) − 1 .
ri =
ci + vi
ki

(18)
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Hence,
ki
1 + ri+1
=
> 1,
1 + ri
ki+1
where the last inequality comes from the use of (2). Hence,
r1 < r2 < · · · < rN .

(19)

This completes the proof.
We will need the following lemma for the proof of the next proposition.
Lemma 1. Let p denote the price of the agricultural commodity at which agriculture as a
whole earns the economy-wide average rate of profit, α, and let p̃ denote the price of the
agricultural commodity which ensures the economy-wide average rate rate of profit, α, for
the worst plot of land; then p < p̃.
Proof. Since p denotes the price of the agricultural commodity at which agriculture as a
whole earns the economy-wide average rate of profit, α, we have

p=

C +V
Y


(1 + α) .

(20)

Using (20) and (7), we see that
p̃
(c1 + v1 ) /y1
=
.
p
(C + V ) /Y
We need to prove that
(c1 + v1 ) /y1 > (C + V ) /Y.
Note that

N
N 
N
X
C +V
1 X
ci + vi  yi  X
=
ci + vi =
=
ki λi
Y
Y i=1
y
Y
i
i=1
i=1
where ki = (ci + vi ) /yi is the average cost of production on plot i and λi = yi /Y so that for
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i = 1, 2, . . . , N , 0 < λi < 1. Under Assumption 1 and the fact that 0 < λi < 1, we have
λi k1 > λi ki ,

i = 2, 3, . . . , N.

Hence
N
X

λi k1 >

i=2

N
X

λi ki

i=2

so that adding λ1 k1 to both sides, we have
λ1 k1 +

N
X

λi k1 > λ1 k1 +

i=2

N
X

λi ki =

i=2

N
X

λi ki

i=1

which shows that
k1

N
X

λi >

i=1

Since

PN

i=1

k1 >

N
X

λi ki .

i=1

λi = 1, this shows that

N
X

λi ki .

i=1

Since (c1 + v1 ) /y1 = k1 and

PN

i=1

λi ki = (C + V ) /Y , this completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Part 1: Note that, by Lemma 1, β > 1. Hence (β − 1) z2 + eβ > 0 (since z2 , e > 0).
Thus, if
z1 <

ez2
(β − 1) z2 + eβ

then, multiplying through by (β − 1) z2 + eβ, we have
z1 z2 (β − 1) + eβz1 < ez2
β (z1 z2 + ez1 ) < z1 z2 + ez2
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which, on division through by z1 z2 (which is a positive quantity), gives
 


e
e
< 1+
β 1+
z2
z1

 

e
e
β 1+
< 1+
1 + OCCE
1 + OCCA

 



e
C +V
e
c1 + v1
1+
<
1+
y1
1 + OCCE
Y
1 + OCCA




c1 + v1
C +V
p̃ =
(1 + r) <
(1 + r∗ ) = p∗ .
y1
Y
Part 2: By Assumption 2, z1 < f (z2 ). This implies that p∗ > p̃, i.e. the price level
that arises from zero net flow of surplus value from agriculture, p∗ , is larger than the price
that ensures positive surplus profit on the worst plot of land, p̃. Hence, intuitively, when
Assumption 2 holds, each plot of land generates surplus profit.
To see this more formally, let A = p∗ − p̃ > 0. Since the price of the agricultural
commodity is p∗ , the rate of profit on the i-th plot, ri is given by
1 + ri =

p̃ + A
p̃
A
p∗
=
= +
ki
ki
ki ki

where ki = (ci + vi )/yi is the average cost of production on plot i. Hence
1 + ri =

p̃
A
p̃ k1 A k1
+ =
+
.
ki ki
k1 ki
ki ki

Let λi = k1 /ki for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . By Assumption 1, we know that k1 > k2 > · · · > kN .
Hence λi > 1 for i = 2, . . . , N . Thus,
1 + ri = λi

p̃
A
+ λi .
k1
k1

(21)

By the definition of p̃ as the price level that ensures the economy-wide average rate of profit
on the worst plot of land, we have p̃/k1 = 1 + α, where α is the economy-wide average rate
of profit. Hence,
ri = −1 + λi (1 + α) + λi

A
A
= (λi − 1) + λi α + λi .
k1
k1
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Hence, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
ri − α = (λi − 1) (1 + α) + λi

A
>0
k1

because λ1 = 1, λi ≥ 1, for i = 2, . . . , N , α ≥ 0 and A > 0. This completes the proof.
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